Abstract. Generalized Selective Decryption (GSD), introduced by Panjwani [TCC'07], is a game for a symmetric encryption scheme Enc that captures the difficulty of proving adaptive security of certain protocols, most notably the Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) multicast encryption protocol. In the GSD game there are n keys k1, . . . , kn, which the adversary may adaptively corrupt (learn); moreover, it can ask for encryptions Enc k i (kj) of keys under other keys. The adversary's task is to distinguish keys (which it cannot trivially compute) from random. Proving the hardness of GSD assuming only IND-CPA security of Enc is surprisingly hard. Using "complexity leveraging" loses a factor exponential in n, which makes the proof practically meaningless. We can think of the GSD game as building a graph on n vertices, where we add an edge i → j when the adversary asks for an encryption of kj under ki. If restricted to graphs of depth , Panjwani gave a reduction that loses only a factor exponential in (not n). To date, this is the only non-trivial result known for GSD. In this paper we give almost-polynomial reductions for large classes of graphs. Most importantly, we prove the security of the GSD game restricted to trees losing only a quasi-polynomial factor n 3 log n+5 . Trees are an important special case capturing realworld protocols like the LKH protocol. Our new bound improves upon Panjwani's on some LKH variants proposed in the literature where the underlying tree is not balanced. Our proof builds on ideas from the "nested hybrids" technique recently introduced by Fuchsbauer et al. [Asiacrypt'14] for proving the adaptive security of constrained PRFs.
Introduction
Proving security of protocols where an adversary can make queries and/or corrupt players adaptively is a notoriously hard problem. Selective security, where the adversary must commit to its queries before the protocol starts, often allows for an easy proof, but in general does not imply (the practically relevant) adaptive security notion [CFGN96] .
Panjwani [Pan07] argues that the two common approaches to achieving adaptive security, namely requiring that all parties erase past data [BH93] , or using non-committing encryption [CFGN96] are not satisfactory. He introduces the generalized selective decryption (GSD) problem and uses it as an abstraction of security requirements of multicast encryption protocols [WGL00, MP06] . GSD is defined by a very simple game that captures the difficulty of proving adaptive security of some interesting protocols.
The generalized selective decryption (GSD) game. In the GSD game we consider a symmetric encryption scheme Enc and a parameter n ∈ N. Initially, we sample n random keys k 1 , . . . , k n and a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. During the game the adversary A can make two types of queries. Encryption query: on input (i, j) she receives c = Enc ki (k j ); corruption query: on input i, she receives k i . At some point, A chooses some i to be challenged on. If b = 0, she gets the key k i ; if b = 1, she gets a uniformly random r i .
3 Finally, A outputs a guess bit b . The goal is prove that for any efficient A, | Pr[b = b ] − 1 / 2 | is negligible (or, equivalently, k i is pseudorandom) assuming only that Enc is a secure encryption scheme. We only allow one challenge query, but this notion is equivalent to allowing any number of challenge queries by a standard hybrid argument (losing a factor that is only the number of challenge queries).
It is convenient to think of the GSD game as dynamically building a graph, which we call key graph. We start with a graph with n vertices labeled 1, . . . , n, where we associate vertex i with key k i . On an encryption query Enc ki (k j ) we add a directed edge i → j. On a corruption query i we label the vertex i as corrupted. Note that if i is corrupted then A also learns all keys k j for which there is a path from i to j in the key graph by simply decrypting the keys along that path. To make the game non-trivial, challenge queries are thus only allowed for keys that are not reachable from any corrupted key. Another restriction we must make is to disallow encryption cycles, i.e., loops in the graph. Otherwise we cannot hope to prove security assuming only standard security (in our case IND-CPA) of the underlying encryption scheme, as this would require circular (or key-dependent-message) security [BRS03] , which is stronger than IND-CPA [ABBC10] . Finally, we require that the challenge query is a leaf in the graph; this restriction too is necessary unless we make additional assumptions on the underlying encryption scheme (cf. Footnote 11).
Selective security of GSD. In order to prove security of the GSD game, one must turn an adversary A that breaks the GSD game with some advantage = | Pr It is not at all clear how to construct an adversary B that breaks IND-CPA from an A that breaks GSD. This problem becomes much easier if we assume that A breaks the selective security of GSD, where A must choose all its encryption, corruption and challenge queries before the experiment starts.
In fact, it is sufficient to know the topology of the connected component in the key graph that contains the challenge node. Let α denote the number of edges in this component. One can now define a sequence of 2α hybrid games H 0 , . . . , H 2α−1 , where the first game is the real game (i.e., the GSD game with b = 0 where the adversary gets the key), the last hybrid is the random game (b = 1), and moreover, from any adversary that distinguishes H i from H i+1 with some advantage , we get an adversary against the IND-CPA security of Enc with the same advantage. Thus, given an A breaking GSD with advantage , we can break the IND-CPA security with advantage ≥ /(2α − 1) ≥ /n 2 (as an n vertex graph has ≤ n 2 edges). We illustrate this reduction in Fig. 1 .
Adaptive security of GSD. In the selective security proof for GSD we crucially relied on the fact that we knew the topology of the underlying key graph. Proving adaptive security, where the adversary decides what queries to ask adaptively during the experiment, is much more difficult. A generic trick to prove adaptive security is "complexity leveraging", where one simply turns an adaptive adversary into a selective one by initially guessing the adaptive adversary's choices and committing to those (as required by the selective security game). If during the security game the adaptive choices by the adversary disagree with the guessed ones, we simply abort. The problem with this approach is that assuming the adaptive adversary has advantage , the constructed selective adversary only has advantage /P where 1 / P is the probability of that our guess is correct, which is typically exponentially small. Concretely, in the GSD game just a semantic change assuming the following: during the experiment we always answer encryption queries of the form (a, b) with Enc ka (k b ) (note that we don't know if we're encrypting the challenge at this point), and once the adversary chooses a challenge i, if b = 1, we simply switch the values of ri and ki (this trick is already used in [Pan07] ).
we need to guess the nodes in the connected component containing the challenge, and as the number of such choices is exponential in the number of keys n, this probability is 2 −Θ(n) . No proofs for the adaptive security of GSD with a subexponential (in n) security loss are known in general. But remember that the GSD problem abstracts problems we encounter in proving adaptive security of many real-world applications where the underlying key graph is typically not completely arbitrary, but often has some special structure. Motivated by this, Panjwani [Pan07] investigated better reductions assuming some special structure of the key graph. He gives a proof where the security degradation is only exponential in the depth of the key graph, as opposed to its size. Concretely, he proves that if the encryption scheme is -IND-CPA secure then the adaptive GSD game with n keys where the adversary is restricted to key graphs of depth is -secure where
Until today, Panjawain's bound is the only non-trivial improvement over the 2 Θ(n) loss for GSD.
Our result. The main result of this paper is Theorem 2, which states that GSD restricted to trees can be proven secure with only a quasi-polynomial loss = · n 3 log(n)+5 .
Our bound is actually even stronger as the entire key graph need not be a tree; it is sufficient that the subgraph containing only the nodes from which the challenge node can be reached is a tree (when ignoring edge directions). The bound above is derived from a more fine-grained bound: assuming that the longest path in the key graph is of length , the in-degree of every node is at most d and the challenge node can be reached from at most s sources (i.e., nodes with in-degree 0) we get
Note that , d and s are at most n and the previous bound was derived from this by setting Fig. 1 : Hybrids for the selective security proof. Green nodes correspond to keys, dark nodes are random values. The adversary A commits to encryption queries (1, 3), (2, 3), (3, 5) and challenge 5 (Encryption query (4, 6) is outside the connected component containing the challenge and thus not relevant for the hybrids. A could also corrupt keys 4 and 6, which are also outside.) Hybrid H0 is the real game, hybrid H5 is the random game, where instead of an encryption of the challenge key Enc k 3 (k5), the adversary gets an encryption of the random value Enc k 3 (r5). If an adversary A can distinguish any two consecutive hybrids Hi and Hi+1 with some advantage δ, we can use A to construct B which breaks the IND-CPA security of Enc with the same advantage δ: E.g., assume B is given an IND-CPA challenge C = Enc k (z) where z is one of two messages (which we call k5 and r5). Now B can simulate game H2 for A, but when A makes the encryption query (3, 5), B answers with C. If z = k5 then B simulates game H2; but if z = r5, it simulates game H3. Note that B can simulate the games because k3, which in the simulation is B's challenger's key, is not used anywhere else. Thus, B has the same advantage in the IND-CPA game as A has in distinguishing H3 from H4.
Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) protocol [WGL00] . Panjwani first fixes a flaw in LKH, and calls the new protocol rLKH with "r" for repaired. rLKH is basically the GSD game restricted to a binary tree.
4
The users correspond to the leaves of this tree, and their keys consists of all the nodes from the root to their leaf. Thus, if the tree is almost full and balanced, then it has only depth ≈ log n and Panjwani's bound loses only a quasi-polynomial factor n log(n)+2 (if = log n). As here d = 2, = log n, s = n, our bound gives a slightly worse bound n log(n)+log log(n)+4 for this particular problem, but this is only the case if a large fraction of the keys are actually used, and the adversary gets to see almost all of them. If is significantly larger than log n (e.g., because only few of the keys are active, or the tree is constructed in an unbalanced way like e.g. proposed in [SS00] ), our bounds decrease only marginally, as opposed to exponentially fast in in [Pan07] .
Graphs with small cut-width. The reason our result is restricted to trees is that in the process of generating the hybrids, we have to guess nodes such that removing this node splits the tree in a "nice" way (this has to be done log n times, losing a factor n in the distinguishing advantage every time).
One can generalize this technique (but we do not work out the details in this paper) to graphs with small "cut-width", where we say that a graph has cut-width w if for any two vertices u, v that are not connected by an edge, there exists a set of at most w vertices such that removing those disconnects u from v (a tree has cut-width w = 1). For graphs with cut-width w we get
which is subexponential in n, and thus beats the existing exponential bound whenever w = o(n/ log 2 (n)). Whether there exists a subexponential reduction which works for any graph is an intriguing open problem.
Shorter keys from better reduction. An exponential security loss (as via complexity leveraging) means that, even when assuming exponential hardness of Enc (which is a typical assumption for symmetric encryption schemes like AES), one needs to use keys for Enc whose length is at least linear in n to get any security guarantee for the hardness of GSD at all. Whereas our bound for trees means that a key of length polylog(n) is sufficient to get asymptotically overwhelming security (again assuming Enc is exponentially hard).
Nested hybrids. In a classical paper [GGM86] Goldreich, Goldwasser and Micali constructed a pseudorandom function (PRF) from a pseudorandom generator (PRG). More recently, three papers independently [BW13, KPTZ13, BGI14] observed that this construction is also a so-called constrained PRF, where for every string x one can compute a constrained key k x that allows evaluation of the PRF on all inputs with prefix x. Informally, the security requirement is that an adversary that can ask for constrained keys cannot distinguish the output of the PRF on some challenge input from random.
All three papers [BW13,KPTZ13,BGI14] only prove selective security of this constrained PRF, where before any queries the adversary must commit to the input on which it wants to be challenged. This proof is a hybrid argument losing a factor 2m in the distinguishing advantage, where m is the PRF input length. One can then get adaptive security losing a huge exponential factor 2 m via complexity leveraging. Subsequently, Fuchsbauer et al. [FKPR14] gave a reduction that only loses a quasi-polynomial factor (3q) log m , where q denotes the number of queries made by the adversary. Our proofs borrows ideas from their work.
Very informally, the idea behind their proof is the following. In the standard proof for adaptive security using leveraging one first guesses the challenge query (losing a huge factor 2 m ), which basically turns the adaptive attacker into a selective one, followed by a simple hybrid argument (losing a small factor 2m) to prove selective security. The proof from [FKPR14] also first makes a guessing step, but a much simpler one, namely which of theueries made by the adversary is the first to coincide with the challenge query on the first m / 2 bits. This is followed by a hybrid argument losing a factor 3, so both steps together lose a factor 3q. At this point the reduction is not finished yet, but intuitively the problem was reduced to itself but on inputs of only half the size m / 2 . These two steps can be iterated log m times (losing a total factor of (3q) log m ) to get a reduction to the security of the underlying PRG.
Proof outline for paths. Our proof for GSD uses an approach similar to the one just explained, iterating fairly simple guessing steps with hybrid arguments, but the analogy ends here, as the actual steps are very different. We first outline the proof for the adaptive security of the GSD game for a special case where the adversary is restricted in the sense that the connected component in the key graph containing the challenge must be a path. Even for this very special case, currently the best reduction [Pan07] loses an exponential factor 2 Θ(n) . We will now outline a reduction losing only a quasi-polynomial n log n factor. 5 Recall that the standard way to prove adaptive security is to first guess the entire connected component containing the challenge, and then prove selective security as illustrated in Fig. 1 .
Our approach is not to guess the entire path, but in a first step only the node in the middle of the path (as we make a uniform guess, it will be correct with probability 1 / n ). This reduces the adaptive security game to a "slightly selective" game where the adversary must commit initially to this middle node, at the price of losing a factor n in the distinguishing advantage.
6
Let H 0 and H 3 denote these "slightly selective" real and random GSD games (we also assume that the adversary initially commits to the challenge query, which costs another factor 5 Let us mention that it is trivial to prove security of GSD restricted to paths if we additionally assume that for random keys k, k the ciphertext Enc k (k ) is uniform given k (this is e.g. the case for one-time pad encryption Enc k (k ) = k ⊕ k ): then the real and random challenge have the same distribution (they're uniform) and thus even a computationally unbounded adversary has zero advantage. (This is because in the path case, every key is used only once to encrypt.) The proof we outline here does not require this special property of Enc, and this will be crucial to later generalize it to more interesting graphs. 6 We never actually construct this "slightly selective" adversary, but (as in complexity leveraging)
we simply commit to a random guess, then run the adaptive adversary, and if its queries are not consistent with our guess, we abort outputting a random value. (We could also output a constant value; the point is that the advantage of the adversary, conditioned on our guess being wrong, is zero; whereas, conditioned on the guess being correct, it is the same as the advantage of the adaptive adversary). However, instead of this experiment it is easier to follow our proof outline by thinking of the adversary actually committing to its choices initially, but the reduction paying a factor (in the distinguishing advantage of the adversary that is allowed to make this choice adaptively) that corresponds to the size of the sample space of this guess.
of n). We illustrate this with a small example featuring a path of length 4 in Fig. 2 . The correct guess for the middle node for the particular run of the experiment illustrated in the figure is i = 5. As now we know the middle vertex is i = 5, we can define new games H 1 and H 2 which are derived from H 0 and H 3 , respectively, by replacing the ciphertext Enc kj (k i ) with an encryption Enc kj (r i ) of a random value (in the figure this is illustrated by replacing the edge
So, what have we gained? If our adaptive adversary has advantage in distinguishing the real and random games then she has advantage at least /n to distinguish the "slightly selective" real and random games H 0 and H 3 , and thus for some i ∈ {0, 1, 2} she can distinguish the games H i and H i+1 with advantage /3n. Looking at two consecutive games H i and H i+1 , we see that they only differ in one edge (e.g., in H 2 we answer the query (3, 5) with Enc k3 (r 5 ), in H 3 with Enc k3 (k 5 )), and moreover this edge will be at the end of a path that now has only length 2, that is, half the length of the path in our original real and random games.
We can now continue this process, constructing new games where the path length is halved, paying a factor 3n in distinguishing advantage. For example, as illustrated in Fig. 2 , we can guess the node that halves the path leading to the differing query in games H 2 and H 3 (for the illustrated path this would be i = 3), then define new games where we assume the adversary commits to this node (paying a factor n), and then define two new games H 2 and H 3 , which are derived from games H 2 and H 3 (which now are augmented by our new guess), respectively, by answering the query (j, i) that asks for an encryption of this node (in the figure (j, i) = (1, 3)) with an encryption Enc k1 (r 3 ) instead of Enc k1 (k 3 ).
If we start with a path of length ≤ n then after log ≤ log n iterations of this process we proved the existence of two consecutive games (call them G 0 and G 1 ) that differ only in a single edge j → i and the vertex j has in-degree 0. That is, both games are identical, except that in one game the encryption query (j, i) is answered with Enc kj (k i ) and in the other with Enc kj (r i ). Moreover, the key k j is not used anywhere else in the experiment and we know exactly when this query is made during the experiment (as the adversary committed to i).
Given a distinguisher A for G 0 and G 1 , we can now construct an attacker B that breaks the IND-CPA security of the underlying encryption scheme with the same advantage: in the IND-CPA game B chooses two random messages m 0 , m 1 and asks to be challenged on them.
7 The game samples a random bit b and returns the challenge C = Enc k (m b ) to B, which must then output a guess b for b. At this point, B invokes A and simulates the game G 0 for it, choosing all keys at random, except that it uses C to answer the encryption query (j, i).
8 Finally, B forwards A's guess b . Identifying (k, m 0 , m 1 ) with (k j , k i , r i ), we see that depending on whether b = 0 or b = 1, B simulates either G 0 or G 1 . Thus, whatever advantage A has in distinguishing G 0 from G 1 , B will break the IND-CPA security of Enc with the same advantage.
Proof outline for trees. We will now outline our reduction of the adaptive security of GSD to the IND-CPA security of Enc for a more general case. Namely, the adversary is only restricted in that the key graph resulting from its queries is such that the connected component containing the challenge is a tree. (Recall that we already disallowed cycles in the key graph as this would require circular security. Being a tree means that we also have no cycles in the key graph when ignoring edge directions). Note that paths as discussed in the previous section are very special trees. The GSD problem on trees is particularly interesting, as it captures some multicast encryption protocols like the Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) protocol [WGL00] . We refer the reader to [Pan07] for details.
Trees with in-degrees ≤ 1. Let us first consider the case where the connected component containing the challenge is a tree, and moreover all its vertices have in-degree 0 or 1. It turns out that the proof outlined for paths goes through with only minor changes for such trees. Note that such a tree has exactly one vertex with in-degree 0, which we call the root, and there is a unique path from the root to the challenge node. We can basically ignore all the edges not on this path and do a reduction as the one outlined above. The only difference is that now, when simulating the game G b (where b is 0 or 1 depending on the whether the challenge C with which we answer the encryption query (j, i) is Enc kj (k i ) or Enc kj (r i )), the adversary can also ask for encryption queries (j, x) for any x. This might seem like a problem as we do not know k j (we identified k j with the key used by the IND-CPA challenger). But recall that in the IND-CPA game there is an encryption oracle Enc kj (·), which we can query for the answer Enc kj (k x ) to such encryption queries.
General Trees. For general trees, where nodes can have in-degree greater than 1, we need to work more. The proof for paths does not directly generalize, as now nodes (in particular, the challenge) can be reached from more than one node with in-degree 0. We call these the sources of this node; for example in the tree H 0 in Fig. 3 , the (challenge) node k 7 has 4 sources k 1 , k 2 , k 3 and k 12 . On a high level, our proof strategy will be to start with a tree where the challenge node c has s sources (more precisely, we have two games that differ in one edge that points to k i in one game, and to r i in the other, like games H 0 and H 7 in Fig. 3) . We then guess a node v that "splits" the tree in a nice way, by which we mean the following: Assume v has in-degree d and we divert every edge going into v to a freshly generated node; let's call them v 1 , . . . , v d . Then this splits the tree into a forest consisting of d + 1 trees (the component containing the challenge and one component for every v i ). The node v "well-divides" the tree if after the split the node c and all of v 1 , . . . , v d have at most s/2 sources.
As an example, consider again the tree H 0 in Fig. 3 , where the challenge node k 7 has 4 sources. The node k 9 would be a good guess, as it well-divides the tree: consider the forest after splitting at this node as described above (creating new nodes v 1 , v 2 , v 3 and diverting the edges going into k 9 to them, i.e., replacing k 5 → k 9 by k 5 → v 1 , k 6 → k 9 by k 6 → v 2 , and k 12 → k 9 by k 12 → v 3 ). Then we obtain 4 trees, where now c = k 7 has only one source (k 9 ) and the new nodes v 1 , v 2 , v 3 have 2, 1 and 1 sources, respectively.
Once we have guessed a well-dividing node v (or equivalently, the adversary has committed to such a node), we define 2d hybrid games (where d is the degree of the well-dividing node) between the two initial games, which we call H 0 and H 2d+1 , as follows. H 1 is derived from H 0 by diverting the first encryption query that asks for an encryption of v (i.e., that is of the form (j, v) for some j) from real to random; that is, we answer with Enc kj (r v ) instead of Enc kj (k v ). For i ≤ d, H i is derived from H 0 by diverting the first i encryption queries. H d+1 is derived from H d by diverting the encryption query that asks for an encryption of the challenge c from real to random. The final d − 1 hybrids games are used to switch the encryption of v back from random to real, one edge at a time. This process is illustrated in the games H 0 to H 7 in Fig. 3 .
Because v was well-dividing (and we show in Lemma 2 that such a node always exists), we can prove the following property for any two consecutive games H i and H i+1 : they differ in exactly one edge, which for some j, v in one game is k j → k v and k j → r v in the other, and moreover, k j has at most s/2 sources.
If an adversary can distinguish H 0 and H 2d+1 with advantage then it must distinguish two hybrids H i and H i+1 with advantage /((2d + 1)n) (where n accounts for guessing the welldividing node). But any such two hybrids now only have at most s/2 sources. If we repeat this guessing/hybrid steps log s times, we end up with two games G 0 and G 1 which differ in one edge that has only one source. At this point we can then use our reduction for trees with only one source outlined above.
Analyzing the Security Loss. To halve the number of sources, we guess a well-dividing vertex (which costs a factor n in the reduction), and then must add up to 2d intermediate hybrids (where d is the maximum in-degree of any node), costing another factor 2d + 1. Assuming that the number of sources is bounded by s, we have to iterate the process at most log s times. Finally, we lose another factor d (but only once) because our final node can have more than one ingoing edge. Overall, assuming the adversary breaks the GSD game with advantage on trees with at most s sources and in-degree at most d, our reduction yields an attacker against the IND-CPA security of Enc with advantage
For general trees, since s, d ≤ n, we have / n 3 log n+5 .
Preliminaries
For a ∈ N, we let [a] = {1, 2, . . . , a} and [a] 0 = [a] ∪ {0}. We say adversary (or distinguisher) D is t-bounded if D runs in time t. 
The GSD Game
In this section we describe the generalized selective decryption game as defined in [Pan07] and
A can make multiple queries of each type, adaptively and in any order. It can also make several challenge queries at any point in the in the game. Allowing multiple challenge queries models the fact that the respective keys are jointly pseudorandom (as opposed to individual keys being pseudorandom by themselves). Allowing to interleave challenges with other queries models that they remain pseudorandom even after corrupting more keys or seeing further ciphertexts. We can think of the n keys that B creates as n vertices, labeled 1, 2, . . . , n, in a graph. In the beginning of the game there are no edges, but every time A queries encrypt(i, j), we add the edge i → j to the graph. When A queries corrupt(i) for some i ∈ [n], we mark i as a corrupt vertex; when A queries challenge(i), we mark it as a challenge vertex. For an adversary A we call this graph the key graph, denoted G(A) and we write V corr (A) and V chal (A) for the sets of corrupt and challenge nodes, respectively. (Note that G(A) is a random variable depending on the randomness used by A and its challenger.)
Legitimate adversaries. Consider an adversary that corrupts a node i in G(A) and queries challenge(j) for some j which is reachable from i. Then A can successively decrypt the keys on the path from i to j, in particular k j , and thus deduce the bit b. We only consider non-trivial breaks and require that no challenge node is reachable from a corrupt node in G(A).
Two more restrictions must be imposed on G(A) if we only want to assume that Enc satisfies IND-CPA. First, we do not allow key cycles, that is, queries yielding
as this would require the scheme to satisfy key-dependent-message (a.k.a. circular) security [BRS03, CL01] .
Second, IND-CPA security does not imply that keys under which one has seen encryptions of random messages remain pseudorandom.
11 Pseudorandomness of keys (assuming only IND-CPA security of the underlying scheme) can thus only hold if their corresponding node does not have any outgoing edges. We thus require that all challenge nodes in the key graph are sinks (i.e., their out-degree is 0). The requirements (as formalized also in [Pan07] ) are summarized in the following. -For all i ∈ V corr (A) and j ∈ V chal (A): j is unreachable from i in G(A). -G(A) is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) and every node in V chal (A) is a sink.
Let n ∈ N + and G be a class of DAGs with n vertices. We say that a legitimate adversary A is a G-adversary if in any execution the key graph belongs to G, i.e., G(A) ∈ G.
Definition 4. Let t ∈ N + , 0 < < 1. An encryption scheme Enc is called (n,
Assuming one challenge query is enough. Although the definition of GSD allows the adversary to make any number of corruption queries, Panjwani [Pan07] observes that by a standard hybrid argument one can turn any adversary with advantage (which makes at most q ≤ n challenge queries) into an adversary that makes only one challenge query, but still has advantage at least /q. From now on we therefore only consider adversaries that make exactly one challenge query (keeping in mind that we have to pay an extra factor n in the final distinguishing advantage for statements about general adversaries).
Single Source
In this section we will analyze the GSD game for key graphs in which the challenge node is only reachable from one source node. That is, for some q ≤ n there is a path p 1 → p 2 → . . . → p q where p 1 has in-degree 0, all nodes p i , 2 ≤ i ≤ q have in-degree 1 (but arbitrary out-degree) and the (single) challenge query is challenge(p q ) (recall that the challenge has out-degree 0). Let G 1 be the set of all such graphs, and G 1 ⊆ G 1 be the subset where this path has length at most .
Theorem 1 (GSD on trees with one path to challenge). Let t ∈ N, 0 < < 1 and G 1 be the class of key graphs just defined. If an encryption scheme is (t, )-IND-CPA secure then it is also (n, t , , G 1 )-GSD secure for = · n (3n) log n and
where T Enc denotes the time required to encrypt a key, and Q Adv denotes an upper bound on the number of queries made by the adversary. 12 More generally, if we replace G 1 with G 1 , we get
GSD on single-source graphs. For b ∈ {0, 1}, we consider the GSD game Exp gsd-(n, b) Enc on G 1 between B and an adversary A. Challenger B first samples n random keys k 1 , k 2 , . . . , k n and we assume that already at this point B samples fake keys r 1 , . . . , r n . On all encrypt(i, j) queries B returns real responses Enc ki (k j ). If b = 0, the response to challenge(z) is k z ; if b = 1, the response is r z .
We require that the key graph is in G 1 , that is the connected component of the key graph which contains the challenge z has a path p 1 → p 2 → . . . → p q = z with p 1 having in-degree 0, all other p i having in-degree 1 and p q = z having out-degree 0 (this means A made queries encrypt(p i−1 , p i ), but no queries encrypt(x, p i ) for x = p i−1 ).
Eventually, A outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}, which is also the output of the game. If the encryption scheme Enc is not (t , , G 1 )-GSD secure then there exists a G 1 -adversary A running in time t such that Pr Exp
Our goal. Suppose we knew that our GSD adversary A wants to be challenged on a fixed node z * and that it will make a query encrypt(y, z * ) for some y which it will not use in any other query. Then we could use A directly to construct a distinguisher D as in Definition 2: D sets up all keys k x , x ∈ [n], samples a value r z * and runs A, answering A's queries using its keys; except when encrypt(y, z * ) is queried for any y ∈ [q], D queries its own challenger on (k z * , r z * ) and forwards the answer to A. Moreover, challenge(z * ) is answered with k z * . If D's challenger, C, chose b = 0, this perfectly simulates the real game for A. If b = 1 then A gets an encryption of r z * and the challenge query is answered with k z * , although in the random GSD game A expects an encryption of k z * and challenge(z * ) to be answered with r z * . However, these two games are distributed identically, since both k z * and r z * are uniformly random values that do not occur anywhere else in the game. Thus D simulates the real game when b = 0 and the random game when b = 1. Note that D implicitly set k y to the key that C chose, but that's fine, since we assumed that k y is not used anywhere else in the game and thus not needed by D for the simulation.
Finally, suppose that, in addition to the challenge z * , we knew y * for which A will query encrypt(y * , z * ). Then we could also allow A to issue queries of the form encrypt(y * , x), for x other than z * . D could easily simulate any such query by querying k x to its encryption oracle.
Unfortunately, general GSD adversaries can decide adaptively on which node they want to be challenged, and worse, they can make queries encrypt(x, y), where y is a key that encrypts the challenge. We will construct a series of hybrids where any two consecutive games Game and Game are such that from a distinguisher A for them, we can construct an adversary D against the encryption scheme with the same advantage. For this, the two games should only differ in the response of one encryption query on the path to the challenge, say encrypt(y, z), which is responded to with a real ciphertext Enc ky (k z ) in Game and with a fake ciphertext Enc ky (r z ) in Game .
Moreover, the key k y must not be encrypted anywhere else in the game, as our distinguisher D will implicitly set k y to be the key of its IND-CPA challenger C. Thus, in Game and Game all queries encrypt(x, y), for any x, are responded to with a fake ciphertext Enc kx (r y ). Summing up, we need the two games to have the following properties for some y:
-Property 1. Game and Game are identical except for the response to one query encrypt(y, z), which is replied to with a real ciphertext in Game and a fake one in Game . -Property 2. Queries encrypt(x, y) are replied to with a fake response in both games.
If we knew the entire key graph G(A) before answering A's queries then we could define a series of 2q − 1 games as in Fig. 1 where we consecutively replace edges from the source to the challenge by fake nodes and then go back replacing fake edges with real ones starting with p q−2 → p q−1 . Any two consecutive games in such a sequence would satisfy the two properties, so we could use them to break IND-CPA.
The problem is that in general the probability of guessing the connected component containing the challenge is exponentially small in n and consequently from a GSD adversary's advantage we will obtain a distinguisher D with advantage = /O(n!). To avoid an exponential loss, we thus must avoid guessing the entire component at once.
The first step. Our first step is to define two new games Game {q} ∅ and Game {q} {q} , which are modifications of Exp gsd-0 and Exp gsd-1 , respectively. Both new games have an extra step at the beginning of the game: B guesses which key is going to be the challenge key and at the end of the game only if its guess was correct, the output of the game is A's output and otherwise it is 0. Clearly B's guess is correct with probability 1 / n . Aside from this guessing step, Game , except for a syntactical change: Let z be the guessed value for the challenge node. Then any query encrypt(x, z) is replied to with Enc kx (r z ), that is, an encryption of the fake key r z . (Note that this game can be simulated, since we "know" z when guessing correctly.) On the other hand, the query challenge(z) is answered with k z (rather than r z in Exp gsd-1 ). Since the difference between Game {q} 1
and Game {q} {q} is that we have replaced all occurrences of k z by r z and all occurrences of r z by k z , which are distributed identically (thus we've merely swapped the names of k z and r z ), we have Pr[Game 
We continue to use the notational convention that for sets I ⊆ P ⊆ [n], the game Game P I is derived from the real game by additionally guessing the nodes corresponding to P and answering encryptions of the nodes in I with fake keys. This is made formal in Fig. 4 below.
The second step. Assume q is a power of 2 and consider Game {q/2, q} ∅ , which is identical to Game {q} ∅ , except that in addition to the challenge node, B also guesses which node x ∈ [n] is going to be the node in the middle of the path to the challenge, i.e. p q/2 = x. The output of Game {q/2, q} ∅ is A's output if the guess was correct and 0 otherwise. Since B guesses correctly with probability 1 / n , we have Pr Game
By guessing the middle node, we can assume the middle node is known and this will enable us to define a hybrid game, Game {q/2, q} {q/2}
, in which the query for the encryption of k p q/2 is responded to with a fake answer. In addition, we consider games Game {q/2, q} {q} and Game {q/2, q} {q/2, q} which are similarly defined by making the same changes to game Game {q} {q} , i.e. guessing the middle node and replying to the encryption query of the guessed key with a fake and a real ciphertext respectively. Again, we have Pr[Game {q/2, q} {q} 
By Line 2, at least one of the pairs of games on the left-hand side must be (t , /3n 2 )-distinguishable. The two games of every pair differ in exactly one point, as determined by the subscript of each game. For instance, the difference between the last pair Game {q/2, q} {q/2, q} and Game {q/2, q} {q} is the encryption of node q/2.
Recall that our goal is to construct a pair of hybrids where the differing query encrypt(y, z) is such that all queries encrypt(x, y) are replied to with Enc kx (r y ), as formalized by Property 2. Games Game {q} ∅ and Game {q} {q} differed in the last query on the path and the only key above it that is not encrypted anywhere is the start of the path. What we have achieved with our -For every i ∈ P , B chooses vi ← [n], which is B's guess for the node at position i in the final path.
-B chooses 2n keys k1, r1, k2, r2 . . . , kn, rn ← {0, 1} λ and runs A.
-Whenever A makes a query encrypt(x, y), B does the following: If y = vi for some i ∈ I then reply with Enc kx (rv i ); otherwise reply with Enc kx (ky). -When A makes the query challenge(z), return kz.
-Let b ∈ {0, 1} be A's output. At then end of the game, consider the longest path p0 → p1 → · · · → pq in G(A), with pq being the argument of A's challenge query. If for all i ∈ P : vi = pi then B returns b ; otherwise, B returns 0. games above is to halve that distance: the first pair, (Game
), and the last pair, (Game {q/2, q} {q/2, q} , Game {q/2, q} {q} ), differ in a node that is only half way down the path; and the middle pair, (Game {q/2, q} {q/2}
, Game {q/2, q} {q/2, q} ), differ in the last node, but half way up the path there is a key, namely k q/2 , which is not encrypted anywhere, as all queries encrypt(x, q/2) are answered with Enc kx (r q/2 ).
The remaining steps. For any of the three pairs that is (t , /3n
2 )-distinguishable (and by Line 2 there must exist one), we can repeat the same process on the half of the path which ends with the query that is different in the two games. For example, assume this holds for the last pair, that is
We repeat the process of guessing the middle node between the differing node and the random node above (in this case the root of the path), which is thus node q/4, and obtain a new pair which satisfies
by Line 3 and the fact that the guess is correct with probability 1 / n . We can now define two intermediate games Game 
where we replaced the encryption of k p q/4 by one of r p q/4 . As in Line 2, we can again define a sequence of games by putting the games in Line 5 between the ones in Line 4 and argue that by Line 4, two consecutive hybrids must be (t , /(3 2 n 3 ))-distinguishable. What we have gained is that any pair in this sequence differs by exactly one edge and the closest fake answer above is only a fourth of the path length away.
Repeating these two steps a maximum number of log q times, we arrive at two consecutive games, where the distance from the differing node to the closest "fake" node above is 1. We have thus found two games that satisfy Properties 1 and 2, meaning we can use a distinguisher A to construct an adversary D against the encryption scheme.
Since a path has at most n nodes, after at most log n steps we end up with two games that are (t , /n(3n) log n )-distinguishable and which can be used to break the encryption scheme. If the adversary is restricted to paths of length (i.e., graphs in G 1 ), this improves to (t , /n(3n) log ).
Proof of Theorem 1. We formalize our method to give a proof of the theorem. In Fig. 4 we describe game Game P I , which is defined by the nodes on the path that are guessed (represented by the set P ) and the nodes where an encryption of a key is replaced with an encryption of a value r (represented by I ⊆ P ). Lemma 1. Let I ⊆ P ⊆ [n] and z ∈ P \ I. Also let y be the largest number in I such that y < z, and y = 0 if z is smaller than all elements in I. If Game P I and Game P I∪{z} are (t, )-distinguishable then the following holds.
-If z > y + 1, define z = y + (z − y)/2 , P = P ∪ {z } and
Then for some i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, games Game P Ii and Game P Ii+1 are (t, /3n)-distinguishable.
Applying Lemma 1 repeatedly log n times (or log if we know an upper bound on the path length ), we obtain the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof.
[of Lemma 1] If z = y + 1 then the pair (Game P I , Game P I∪{z} ) satisfies Properties 1 and 2. As we'll explain below, this allows us to construct distinguisher D that breaks the IND-CPA security of the encryption scheme with the same advantage, in time t that it takes to run A plus the time that it takes to simulate the game Game P I , which consists of at most Q Adv encryption or challenge queries, each taking time T Enc , plus someÕ(Q Adv ) bookkeeping overhead. Thus we get a total running time of of t + Q Adv T Enc +Õ(Q Adv ).
In both games the query encrypt(p y−1 , p y ) is answered with Enc kp y−1 (r py ), meaning that k py is never encrypted (as there cannot be other queries encrypt(x, p y ), since A is a G 1 adversary). Moreover, note that p y cannot be queried to corrupt either. The query encrypt(p y , p z ) is responded to with a real answer Enc kp y (k pz ) in Game P I and with a fake answer Enc kp y (r pz ) in Game P I∪{z} . We now let our distinguisher D against Enc simulate the game Game P I implicitly replacing k py with its challenger's key (but sampling all remaining real and random keys itself). D answers queries encrypt(p y , x), for x = p z by using the encryption oracle. When A queries encrypt(p y , p z ), D outputs the challenge (k pz , r pz ) and forwards the answer to A. Depending on D's challenger's bit, D either simulates Game and Game P ∪{z } I∪z are (t, /n)-distinguishable: the guess of z ← [n] does not influence A's behavior (it only influences B's output after A has stopped), and the probability of guessing correctly is 1 / n . We therefore have Pr[Game
= 1] for any J ⊆ P and thus
By the triangle inequality we have (recall that P = P ∪ {z }):
Thus at least one of the pairs must be (t, /3n)-distinguishable.
General Trees
For a node v in a directed graph G let T v denote the subgraph of G we get when only keeping the edges on paths that lead to v. In this section we prove bounds for GSD if the underlying key graph is a tree. Concretely, let G τ be the class of key graphs that contain one designated "challenge node" z and where the graph T z is a tree (when ignoring edge directions).
To give more fine-grained bounds we define a subset G s,d, τ ⊆ G τ as follows. For G ∈ G τ , let z be the challenge node and T z as above. Then G ∈ G s,d, τ if the challenge node has at most s sources (i.e., there are at most s nodes u of in-degree 0 s.t. there is a directed path from u to z), every node in T z has in-degree at most d and the longest path in T z has length at most . Note that as d < n, s < n and ≤ n any G ∈ G τ with n nodes is trivially in G n−1,n−1,n τ . Theorem 2 (Security of GSD on trees). Let n, t ∈ N, 0 < < 1 and G τ be the class of key graphs just defined. If an encryption scheme is (t, )-IND-CPA secure then it is also (n, t , , G τ )-GSD secure for = · n 2 (6n 3 ) log n ≤ · n 3 log n +5
and
(with Q Adv , T Enc as in Theorem 1). If we replace G τ with G
Proof of Theorem 2
Notation. As all our graphs will have vertex set [n], with "graph" we also refer to the set of edges of a graph. Thus for two graphs (set of edges) T, T , by T \ T we mean the graph T (with vertex set [n]) after removing all edges of T and T ∪ T is the graph of all edges of T and T . For a node x ∈ [n] we denote by T x the graph (set of edges) of all the paths in G(A) that reach x. Recall that a node with in-degree 0 is called a source and denote by S(v) the number of sources in the tree T v . Note that S(v) is also the number of paths to a node v. For a tree T with at least 2 sources we say a node v well-divides T if the number of sources in each subtree obtained from removing all edges of the form * → v, is less than or equal to half of the sources in T. If (x, y) ∈ T, we call x a parent of y and y a child of x. Furthermore, we let x[i] denote the i-th parent of node x, which means that in the GSD game resulting in G(A) there was a query encrypt(x[i], x) and before that there were i − 1 queries of the form encrypt(y, x) with y = x[i].
Our approach. Generalizing the proof for single-source graphs from Section 4, we will define a sequence of hybrids such that there are two games Game and Game which have the following properties:
-the two games differ in exactly one query, encrypt(y, z); -the node y has only one source, i.e., S(y) = 1.
Finding Game and Game will enable us to apply Theorem 1 to these two games and derive contradiction as we did before.
In the single-source game we guessed which node will be in the middle of the path to the challenge, as this allowed us to reduce the problem to smaller problems. Here we need a new metric since there are multiple paths. Whereas before we halved the length of the path to the challenge, we now first halve the number of such paths, by guessing a node v that well-divides the tree.
Let us look at the original games Exp gsd-0 and Exp gsd-1 and suppose they are δ-distinguishable. Unlike for the single-source case, these games differ not in one but in at most d edges: with z denoting the challenge, in Exp gsd-0 all edges * → z are real, whereas they are fake in Exp gsd-1
(and there are at most d of them). We start with defining two new games, where the only change is that we guess the challenge node. Other than that Game All other queries are responded with real answers. In the end A outputs bit b ∈ {0, 1}. -Define T
(1) , . . . , T (m P ) from P, v1, . . . , vm P as in Line 7.
-If v1 is the challenge node and for i > 1, vi well-divides T (i) , then return b; otherwise return 0. an IND-CPA distinguisher. We lost another factor 1/(3n) log . In total, starting from a GSD adversary with success probability δ, we obtain an IND-CPA distinguisher with probability
To formalize this approach, in Figure 5 we formally define a hybrid game Game P I , where P determines the nodes we guess in the graph and I determines the queries (involving the guessed nodes) that are replied to with a fake answer. In contrast to Section 4, P and I are ordered lists rather than sets. We explain our definition in the following.
Checking whether we've guessed correctly. We start with explaining how in Game P I
we check whether our guesses were well-dividing nodes. As an example, consider Figure 3 . H 0 corresponds to Game (0,1) (0,0) (the superscripts mean that we must guess the challenge v 1 (the 0 in (0, 1)) and a splitting node v 2 for the tree T v1[1] that ends in the first (denoted by 1 in (0, 1)) edge going into the challenge; the subscripts mean that there are 0 fake edges going into v 1 and 0 fake nodes going into v 2 . Guesses v 1 = 7 and v 2 = 9 would be correct, since A queried challenge(7) and v 2 = 9 well-divides the first subtree going into the challenge, that is T v1 . Now consider H 3 and H 4 , corresponding to Game (1,3) ). If we were to further recurse between these games, we thus never have to consider T v2 anymore, because in all games all edges going into v 2 are fake edges.
The tree T (i) , which v i should well-divide is thus defined for i = 1, . . . as follows: as long as there have not been any a i = P [i] with a i = 0 (that is, we considered a subtree below the splitting node), T (i) is the tree ending in the a i -th parent of v i−1 (that is, T vi−1 [ai] ). When we have a i = 0 for the first time then the lower subtree is chosen, that is T (i) = T (i−1) \T vi−1 . In any further recursion, we need not consider T vi−1 anymore, so we store it as R (i) (for "removed").
. We need to apply the same method for the rest of the guessed nodes as well. Meaning we let R (i) be the set of all the removed edges in the first ith steps and we first remove R (i) from T vi−1 [ai] or T (i−1) for a i ≥ 1 and a i = 0 respectively, and what is left must be well-divided by the new guessed node. Formally,
Set I and the hybrid games. In Section 4 the set I was a subset of P and for every x in I the query encrypt( * , x) was responded with a fake answer. Unlike before, here we can have multiple queries of form encrypt( * , x), therefore I needs to determine which queries are fake for each node in P . To do so, the i-th element in I, e i , determines that the first e i queries encrypt( * , v i ) are responded with fake answers and the rest of queries are responded with real ones. If e i = 0 then all such queries are replied with real answers.
Previously, for each new element z added to P , and for any game Game P I , we defined two new hybrid games, one with a fake response and one with a real response to the query encrypt( * , z). Thus for any pair of games Game The differentiating step in these two games is encrypt(v i [e i ], v i ). Therefore the new element (to be guessed) must be in the subtree that ends with v i [e i ]. That's why if the (i + 1)-th element is already in the set P then it must be a i+1 = e i , and to add a new element in P we must set a m = 0. On the other hand, if a i is the last element in S, the new element must be a m = e i . Thus we only need to define 2(d + 1) games which create 2d + 1 pairs of games satisfying Property 1, as listed below.
Finally, one of the pairs of games satisfying property 1, must be δ/n(2d + 1)-distinguishable, if Game P I and Game P I are δ-distinguishable. In Lemma 3 we formalize this argument. Let us first show that well-dividing nodes always exist.
Lemma 2. Let T be a tree of n nodes, s sources, s ≥ 2 and let x be a sink in T with strictly more than one source reaching x. Then there exists a node x * in T such that x * well-divides
Proof. [of Lemma 2] We proof Lemma 2, by giving an algorithm that finds x * in T x in Figure 6 . Let S(x) denote the number of sources in the subtree T x and let x[1], . . . , x[d] be all nodes where there is an edge x[i] → x in T. As long as S(x) ≥ 2, the following algorithm will output a node x * in tree T x such that x * well-divides T x .
Termination. In each iteration of the while loop either x is replace with one of its parents, which can happen at most n times before reaching a source, or the algorithm terminates. Therefore there can be at most be n iterations of the while loop.
Correctness. The algorithm starts from the sink x of the tree and it traverses the tree up until it finds a well-dividing node. In each iteration, the variable m keeps track of the number of sources in the subtree T − T x , where x is the node at hand and T is the tree it started with. In other words, at each iteration of the while loop, m + S(x) is the total number of sources in the tree. Note that at most one of the parents of x can satisfy the predicate of the if statement and if such a parent exists then that node has more than half of the sources of the entire tree, so we update m and x accordingly and search for the well-dividing node in the new T x . On the other hand, if no such a parent exists, it means that after removing all the ingoing edges of x from the tree all the subtrees ending in one of the parents of x have less sources than half of the sources of the entire tree. Also note that m is never greater than s T /2, since m is changed only when S(x[i]) > s T /2. Therefore the tree T \ T x has less than s T /2 sources as well, meaning x is the well-dividing node. Consequently at least one of the 2d + 1 pairs of games, on the left hand side of the inequality above, must be (t, /n(2d + 1))-distinguishable. On the other hand if no such a node exists we simply ignore the rest of the guessed nodes in the game. Then Game Since every guessing step reduces the number of sources in the subtree reaching the challenge into at most half of what it was before, after m − 1 = log s steps, we know for certain that there is at most one source left in the subtree reaching the challenge, in which case we can apply Lemma 1 at most log times to conclude the proof.
Guessing the challenge node and defining games Game 
Conclusions and Open Problems
We showed a quasipolynomial reduction of the GSD game on trees to the security of the underlying symmetric encryption scheme. As already discussed in the introduction, it is an interesting open problem to extend our reduction to general (directed, acyclic) graphs or to understand why this is not possible. This is the second result using the "nested hybrids" technique (after its introduction in [FKPR14] to prove the security of constrained PRFs), and given that it found applications for two seemingly unrelated problems, we believe that there will be further applications in the future.
One candidate is the problem of proving security under selective opening attacks [DNRS99] [FHKW10, BHY09] , where one wants to prove security when correlated messages are encrypted under different keys. Here, the adversary may adaptively chose to corrupt some keys after seeing all ciphertexts, and one requires that the messages in the unopened ciphertexts are indistinguishable from random messages (sampled so they are consistent with the already opened ciphertexts). This problem is notoriously hard, and no reduction avoiding complexity leveraging to IND-CPA security of the underlying scheme is known.
